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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to give a comprehensive explanation of the
worldwide trade and environment conflicts and a thorough analysis of the trade and
environment debate between trade specialists and environmentalists. After a general
introduction of the origin of and the critical issues involved in the trade and environment
debate, this thesis discusses the complicated relation between trade and environment on
the basis of economic theory and empirical studies. Then it examines the resolution of
specific trade and environment conflicts within a multilateral trading system and the
relative role of WTO in accommodating environmental interest into the trade
liberalization. At last it comes to its conclusion that there is no inherent conflict between
trade liberalization and environmental protection and trade and environment should go
hand in hand to achieve a sustainable development and the improvement of human
welfare as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed two different aspects of the development of human
society: on the one hand, the blinding pace of economic growth all over the world created
by the liberalization of trade on the one hand, and on the other, the dramatic degradation
of environment on our planet in both international and national level, on the other. Not
only the scope and the severity of them attract the worldwide attention, the complicated
relation between international economy especially international trade and environmental
protection has made “trade and environment” a hot topic in every aspect of human life.
As a result, two camps, which are led by environmentalists and free traders respectively,
and a trade and development debate between these two camps, have appeared. The main
issue here is whether there is a fundamental conflict between trade liberalization and
environmental protection, or put in another way, can the goal of trade liberalization be
achieved without the sacrifice of environmental interests, or even benefiting
environmental protection at the same time? This article serves as an effort to address this
issue by a thorough analysis of the relation of trade and environment, and, in particular,
the relative role of WTO as the leader of the trade regime. Chapter 1 gives a general
introduction of the Trade and Environment debate; Chapter 2 addresses three critical
questions about the relation between trade and environment involved in the debate and
the possibility of their convergence; Chapter 3 discusses the role of WTO in
accommodating environmental interests into the multilateral trading system by analyzing
the key environment-related issues under WTO; Chapter 4 concludes that there is no
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fundamental conflict between trade and environment, and WTO can help to achieve the
goal of trade liberalization while maintaining or promoting environmental interests.
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CHAPTER 1
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DEBATE
Origins of the trade and environment debate
Trade and environment used to be two completely distinct worlds that developed on
separate tracks and neither trade specialists nor environmentalists ever perceived their
realms as interacting. The recent clash between trade and environment can be traced back
to some newly developed social trends all over the world1:
• Rising interest in the environment
During the past several decades, more than two hundred multilateral environmental
agreements have been created, governmental or non-governmental environmental
organizations have spread to every corner of the world, while the number of
environmentally conscious consumers also keeps growing. This dramatic rise of interest
in the environment is, in part attribute to the increased social wealth, especially in
developed countries, where the quality of life becomes more salient and at the same time
people can afford a higher environmental standard. In addition, the increasing visibility of
environmental problems, especially the occurrence of several of the most notorious
environmental accidents such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Chernobyl nuclear
accident has extended this trend across the world, including some of the least developed
countries.
• Ecological interdependence

1

See DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE, INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, Cha 1, 9-23, 1994.
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In the field of environmental policy making, the interdependence of the ecological
systems on the earth has been realized with the emergence of global environmental
problems such as ozone depletion and climate change. Even a current local
environmental problem, such as the loss of wetlands in China, will cause significant
negative effect on the global environment in the near future. As a result, coordinated,
multilateral environmental programs are required to address environmental problems.
Thus, it has been more and more popular to use market-access or other trade measure in
international environmental agreements to encourage broad participation. The best
example would be the Montreal Protocol, which generally bans the trade of certain
products with ozone depletion substances between members and nonmembers to protect
the members from a potential competitive disadvantage in the international market of
these products2. In addition, some countries such as the United States have begun to use
trade measures unilaterally to affect the environmental policies in other countries3. This
has got on the nerves of trade specialists, who fear the more and more common use of
trade restrictions or penalties for an environmental purpose will impair the multilateral
trade systems as well as the open and uniform world market, especially when
environmental protection is used as an excuse for a disguised protectionism.
• Economic interdependence
Another factor that drives trade and environment together is the economic integration
and interdependence among countries promoted by trade liberalization. The intensity of
global competition makes one country’s own environmental policy an international

2

See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY, Cha 9, 544 (2nd ed. 2002).
3
See Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Unilateralism and the WTO/GATT System, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
433.

5
concern, since it may affect this country’s competitiveness in the world market.
Environmentalists particularly fear the pressure from international competition will force
governments to choose lax environmental standards with less cost to achieve a
competitive advantage.
The arguments in the trade-environment debate4
A number of arguments from environmentalists suggest that trade liberalization
constitutes a serious threat to the world environmental quality and protection:
• Without environmental safeguards, trade may cause environmental harm by
promoting economic growth that results in the unsustainable consumption of natural
resources and waste production.
• Trade liberalization enables pollution industries to move from countries with tough
environmental standards to countries with lax environmental standards to reduce the costs
of pollution abatement, which will increase the total amount of pollution all over the
world.
• Even if the pollution they cause does not spill over into other nations, countries with
lax environmental standards have a competitive advantage in the global marketplace and
put pressure on countries with high environmental standards to reduce the rigor of their
environmental requirements, or feel reluctant to develop new environmental policies.
• In practice, trade restrictions that should be available as leverage to promote
worldwide environmental protection, particularly to address global or transboundary
environmental problems and to reinforce international agreements have been limited or
forbidden by trade rules and the multilateral trade regimes, led by WTO.

4

See ESTY, supra note 1, Cha 2, at 42; see also HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 15, at
1127.
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As a response, trade specialists argue that:
• International trade helps specialize the production of goods and services and
maximize economies of scale, thus promoting the efficient use of natural resources with
the force of international competition.
• International trade promotes economic growth and wealth creation and thus
generates the political demand and capacity for environmental protection, particularly in
developing countries.
• Increased commercial transactions among different nations and cultures driven by
liberalized trade stimulate the sharing of experiences, policies, and ideas, which in turn
stimulate the dissemination of environment-friendly technology and the public conscious
of environmental problems.

7

CHAPTER 2
ANALYZING THE TRADE-ENVIRONMENT DEBATE:
THE COMPLICATED RELATION BETWEEN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT
In summary, the three key questions involved in the trade-environment debate are the
following: first, whether economic integration through trade and investment constitutes a
threat to the environment. Second, whether trade undermines the regulatory efforts of
governments to control pollution and resource degradation. And third, whether economic
growth driven by trade will simply result in a more unsustainable consumption all over
the world, beyond the carrying capacity of our environment or, on the contrary, promote
a sustainable use of the world environmental resources.
Before addressing these questions, a brief review of the root causes of environmental
degradation will be important so that we can know from where trade can affect the
environment. Generally all the factors that speed up environmental degradation can be
traced back to “market failures” and “policy failures”.5
“Market Failures” refer to situations in which the market forces of supply and
demand fail to deliver an optimal outcome for society as a whole, which commonly
occurs when producers and consumers do not have to bear the full cost of their actions, or
the property rights over resources are undefined6. An extreme example is the “tragedy of
commons”, a phenomena in which open-access and ruleless resources are often exploited

5

See Hakan Nordstrom & Sott Vaughan, Special Studies 4: Trade and Environment, 13, WTO
Publications, 1999, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/environment_e.pdf.
6
See id.
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due to the market’s failing to reflect the scarcity of these resources through price signal7.
Many environmental resources are “public goods” and thus continue to suffer the
“tragedy of the commons”. Clean air, water, and especially marine resources such as
whale stocks, are free for all but valued by no one.
In some cases people can work out some conservation-cum-distribution scheme
between themselves. For example, in the sheep hypothesis of Hardin, the shepherds may
come together and issue some limit on the use of pastures and sanctions for overuse.
Then the pastures may be maintained to a sustainable level.8 But when the given
resources are diffuse or the people are too many or too difficult to organize, which is
always the case in environmental problems, a market solution may not be possible and
thus it’s up to the government to correct the market failure by proper environmental
policies. However, chances are that governments may not omit to do so but may also add
a few distortions of their own, which is described as “policy failure”9.
Ideally, governments would use proper environmental policies, such as “polluter pays
principle” to internalize the full environmental costs of production and consumption, and
the market failure would be corrected directly at the source by appropriate tax and
regulations. However, governments are not always responsive to their citizens’ welfare
and values. In the real world, the environmental policies reflect the nature of the
government and the influence of dominant economic or political factions. Some
governments may be shortsighted, incompetent or even corrupt10 and thus fail to adopt
7

See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 3, at 127-129 (quoting GARRETT HARDIN,
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS, 168 Science 243 (1968)).
8
See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 3, at 129 (quoting GARRETT HARDIN, TRAGEDY OF
THE COMMONS, 168 Science 243 (1968)).
9
See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 14.
10
See H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD PRODUCT, Cambridge
University Press, 1988, at 226.
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adequate laws or enforce them effectively. When this is the case, trade liberalization
could exacerbate the consequences of poor environmental policies.11 For example,
without scientific, efficient management of the natural resources within a nation, the
competition pressure from the world market may encourage unsustainable fishing and
logging and thus aggravate the degradation of natural resources. On the other hand, trade
itself, as well as the environment, may suffer from policy failures such as fishing subsidy,
which not only distorts international trade but also contributes to over-fishing.
When trade interacts with market failures and policy failures, it affects the
environment directly or indirectly. And it should be made clear that what we talk about
here is whether there is a fundamental, inherent conflict between trade and environment.
Trade and environment conflicts with each other everywhere and new trade and
environment conflicts are on the horizon especially in the areas of intellectual property,
subsidies, and trade in services. But do these conflicts attribute to some inherent
negativity of trade against the environment, or attribute to some other factors such as
inappropriate international or national policies or laws, which distort not only
environment, but also trade? Now, we will discuss this issue around the three key
questions mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
The effect of economic integration through trade on environment
The worldwide economic integration through liberalized trade has significant and
complicated effects on both the domestic and international market. One is the industrial
restructuring that takes place when a country exposes itself to the world market, which is
called “composition effect”12. After examining its comparative advantage and
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See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 26.
See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 29.
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disadvantage, a country may choose to expand its export in some sectors or, on the
contrary, to expand import in other sectors. Here trade is associated with a relocation of
pollution problems around the world. It is always assumed by the environmentalists that
polluting industries are likely to migrate from developed to developing countries to take
advantage of lax regulations and therefore increase overall pollution in the world.
However, this assumption does not seem to be supported by either trade theory or
empirical evidence. For example, in a recent study, Birdsall and Wheeler13 examined
changes in the pollution intensity of output in various industrial sectors in developing
countries from 1960 through 1990 that had resulted from shifts in the sectoral
composition of output in order to test the hypothesis that international trade in product
and investment would lead to the migration of industry to less developed countries that
tend to have less stringent environmental requirements. With this hypothesis, a faster
growth in industrial pollution intensity should be expected in economies that are
relatively open to trade (those with low trade barriers and few restrictions on capital
flows) as opposed to those relatively closed economies. Contrary to their hypothesis, they
found that the relatively closed economies were more pollution intensive. Another study
examining direct investment by heavily regulated U.S. industries in facilities abroad
found a small increase in such investment by the chemical and mineral processing
industries from 1970-80, but this increase in heavily regulated industries’ investment in
developing countries was no greater than that of U.S. industry as whole.14

13

See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J.
2039, 2077 (quoting Nancy Birdsall & David Wheeler, Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin
America: Where Are the Pollution Havens? 159, 167).
14
See id. at 2078 (quoting H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
PRODUCT, 94, 96).
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Several factors may explain these findings. First, polluting industries tend to be
capital-intensive industries such as chemicals, pulp and paper, and oil refining.
Theoretically these industries are more likely to conglomerate in capital-abundant
countries, which are usually developed or newly industrialized countries. Developing
countries, on the contrary, are usually label-intensive.15 In addition, in decisions
regarding the setting of new facilities, some traditional factors, such as raw material,
access to markets, transportation, and general business climates tend to be more
determinative than the differences in environmental standards.16 There are of course some
exceptions, but data tells us that developed countries’ share of pollution countries has
remained at about 75-80 percent in recent decades and has even increased slightly in the
1990s.17 Even for those industries that have moved to developing countries, studies of
industrial development in Chile, the fertilizer industry in Bangladesh, and steel
manufacturing in developing countries have found that new industrial projects achieved
much higher degrees of pollution control than legally required, some even comparable to
those achieved in developed countries.18 This may reflect that, for many multilateral
firms, it is less costly to duplicate the home technology than to modify the process in
each country.
On the other hand, the moving of pollution industries from countries with tougher
environmental regulations to countries with comparatively laxer environmental
regulations or standards may not be a bad thing for the environment if such differences in
environmental standards among countries appropriately reflect the different assimilative

15

See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 32.
See Stewart, supra note 13, at 2077.
17
See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 32.
18
See Stewart, supra note 13, at 2070.
16
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capacities in those countries. A country’s capacity to assimilate pollution depends on its
geographic, ecological, and demographic characteristics, which vary from one country to
another.19 A country with fast-running, short rivers can assimilate a higher level of water
pollution with less environmental harm than a country with slow-running, long rivers.
Also, with a given level of air pollution, a large sparsely populated country will suffer
adverse health and environmental effects than will a small, densely populated country.20
As a result, when pollution industry moves from countries with lower assimilative
capacity to countries with higher assimilative capacity, even if the total emission
increases slightly, the actual environmental harm may be the same or even less. Thus as
long as the environmental policy in a country reflects its assimilative capacity correctly,
liberalized trade can help raise consumption without compromising the natural
environment and therefore benefit the welfare of human beings and its environment as a
whole. At least in this sense, there are no inherent conflicts between trade and
environment.
However, conflicts do arise when the political institutions in different countries fail to
make appropriate environmental policies, regulations or standards that reflect their actual
environment-carrying capacity in these countries. Then comes the second question,
whether the pressure from international competition driven by a multilateral trade system
will undermine environmental policies.
The effect of liberalized trade on domestic environmental policies
A classical critique from environmentalists against trade liberalization is that the
globalization of the world economy promoted by trade makes industries more foot-loose

19
20

See id. at 2052.
See Stewart, supra note 13, at 2052.
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and more difficult to regulate, and at the same time, the governments, due to the pressure
from international competition, tend to relax their current environmental standards, or at
least are reluctant to develop new environmental policies in order to keep or increase
their competitiveness in the international market. But against the assumption of
environmentalists, the cost of environmental regulation does not seem to be enough to
affect the competitiveness of a country significantly. For example, studies of the United
States environmental regulation costs found that though compliance expenditures for
pollution control are large in absolute terms, they represent an average of only .54% of
total production costs for industry as a whole and from 1% to 3% for the most heavily
regulated industries.21 It is questionable whether a regulatory cost-disadvantage of few
percentage points will turn comparative advantage around. Also, the compliance costs are
always overestimated since in practice the pressure from tough environmental regulations
usually encourages industries to develop new technologies that reduce both the input of
energy and resources and the pollution during the production process, thereby offsetting
the direct compliance costs. For example, the costs of federal air and water pollution
control in the United States for 1981, which was estimated by EPA at $42.5 billion, were
only $28 billion when indirect effects such as the substitution effects that result in fewer
purchases thus reducing output of products whose price has increased as a result of
regulation were analyzed.22 Moreover, the cost of the environmental rules or standards
with the same level of stringency may vary from one another due to the different policy
instruments and legal and administrative approaches chosen to implement theses
standards. Command-and-control regulations, like those used in the United States, are
21

See Stewart, supra note 13, 2062-2063.
See id. 2066-2067, (quoting Michael Hazilla & Raymond J, Kopp, Social Cost of Environmental Quality
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. ECON. 853 (1990), at 865).
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considerably more costly than market-based instruments that allow producers greater
flexibility. It has been found that compared to that in the United States (.28%), the
adverse impact of environmental regulation on productivity in Japan, which has
comparable stringent environmental standards, was quite small (.06%), due to the greater
flexibility of the Japanese regulatory systems.23
On the other hand, though it is that true stringent environmental regulations cost more
than lax ones, they also bring significant benefit to society and the quality of life. Some
may argue that many of the benefits of environmental regulation are nonpecuniary such
as the enjoyment of clean air, and thus will not be taken into account in a government’s
cost-benefit analysis for its choice of environmental policies. However, first whether
most countries will be so shortsighted is still questionable and second, stringent
environmental requirement does bring observable pecuniary benefits. Cleaner water will
lower the costs of treating water by industries in their production processes, cleaner air
and more nutritious soil will help reduce crop injury and boost agricultural output, and
more importantly, the improved environmental quality will bring a healthier and therefore
more productive workforce. 24Compared to the few percentage points cost, the significant
benefits of enhanced environmental protection are more possible to play an important
role in governments’ cost-benefit balancing.
What is more, though the production cost may be an important factor that affects
competitive advantage, it is not the only factor that counts. With the number of
environment-conscious consumers growing, firms, especially those multinational firms
that are based in countries with active environmental communities, become more and

23
24

See Stewart, supra note 13, at 2069.
See id. at 2065.
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more sensitive to their reputation in the international market.25 We should not forget that
it was the unilateral public announcement by Johnson Wax, the consumer products
company, to replace CFCs in its brand-leading products such as Pledge and Glade in
1975, ten years before the creation of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer that triggered a competitive race for CFC-free aerosols in the United
States.26 Without any government intervention, most companies’ fear of losing sales to
environmentally conscious consumers drove them voluntarily away from CFCs to butane
propellants. Empirical studies have shown that industrial environmental leaders can
always recoup costs in the marketplace, and, under some circumstances may even enjoy
certain competitive advantages. As an example, firms that accord with the environmental
management standards promulgated by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO 14000) seem to enjoy certain competitive advantages, including lower liability
insurance, less regulatory oversight, and increased access to customers27. And in certain
fields, the adoption of ISO 14001 has become a prerequisite for market access to
international markets. For example, the car manufacturers Rover and Jaguar, located in
the UK, have required that more than 1000 of their first tire suppliers of products either
achieve or move towards ISO 14001.28 Indeed, with more and more consumers willing to
pay extra money for environment-friendly products, “green products” and “green
technology” themselves become a new market focus. This explains the phenomenon that
organic grocery stores like Earth Fare within which the price for an apple may be two or
three times higher than that in Wal-Mart still enjoy high profitability. In short, when

25

See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 41.
See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 9, at 535.
27
See Nordstrom & Vaughan, supra note 5, at 41.
28
See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 18, at 1422.
26
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consumers care, market forces often reward good environmental performance rather than
cost savings at any price. And in this case a high environmental standard may serve as a
comparative advantage itself.
Yet market force cannot be counted to solve all the problems themselves. It is only
recently that the consumers become sensitive to environmental profile of products and
producers, which attribute greatly to the persistent efforts of non-governmental
organizations around the world. Also, governments may be incompetent, shortsighted, or
even corrupt so that they may not weigh the benefits of environmental protection against
it costs correctly. Yet this may happen with or without trade. From the discussion above
we can conclude that the difference in the stringency of environmental standards among
countries barely affect their competitiveness as a whole and it is definitely not reasonable
to regard the competitive concern rather than a country’s actual assimilative capacity as a
decisive factor in the country’s adoption of certain environmental policies. If for some
reasons the governments do think so, it is not trade that should be blamed. Governments
should play their part by basing their policy choice on scientific analysis rather than
unreasonable assumption. And as a matter of fact, the competitiveness concerns are only
enough to make governments seek cooperative solution to environmental problems
before they apply certain environmental measures unilaterally, which actually serves as a
positive force for the growing number of multilateral environmental agreements.
The effect of economic growth promoted by trade on environment
Trade is an approach mastered by human society to promote economic prosperity and
finally improve the welfare of human beings as a whole. However, it has been claimed
that economic growth leads to unsustainable consumption beyond the environmental
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carrying capacities and finally exhausts all the natural resources necessary for human
activities, especially those non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels. Thus trade, as
the promoter of economic growth, should be limited. However, the consistent discovery
of new deposits of fossil fuels has met the demand, and a more practical question now is
whether we should use them considering the negative effect on global climate. In
addition, as long as poverty is still a common phenomenon on this planet and the rich
developed countries do not want to help their poor neighbors for free, economic growth is
still necessary. Indeed, one reason for the environmental problems in many developing
countries is that these countries could not afford an adequate level of environmental
protection. Economic growth can allow these countries to shift from some more
immediate concerns to long-run sustainability issues. A famous example here is the
Kuznets curve29, which shows that pollution increases at the early stages of development
but decreases after a certain income level has been reached.
But it is not right to think the Kuznets curve will turn naturally and necessarily. It will
only turn when the income growth is accompanied by improved political conditions, and
in developing countries, the quality of environment will be improved only if economic
growth and institutional and democratic reforms go hand in hand. Yet even this is more
practical than an effort to stop economic growth all over the world by eliminating
international trade. Trade can help achieve a more sustainable economic growth by
spreading environmental-friendly technologies around the world.
In summary, the relation between trade and environment is much more complicated
than a simple question of yes or no. Yet both economic theories and empirical studies fail
to support there is any inherent or fundamental conflict between the protection of
29

See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 2, at 55.
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environment and an open, multilateral trading system. Accompanied with appropriate
political mechanisms and social policies, trade can benefit the resolution of
environmental problems by rationalizing the use of natural resources. A good example
here is the policies that aim at the internalization of environmental externalities. As
addressed above, theoretically, trade liberalization and environmental protection both aim
at “rationalizing” the use of resources. However, because many environmental resources
are “public goods” and thus priced as zero in the market and the cost of pollution and
other environmental impairment is usually bore by the whole society rather than the
producers themselves, which is usually referred to as environmental externalities, the
price mechanism sometimes fail to reflect the true cost of the totality of the resource
being used during production in the international market thus far.30 A number of political
efforts have been made to address this problem, including tax or fees imposed on a source
in proportion to the environmental degradation it imposes, such as the wetland
compensation fees in the United States and pollution permit systems requiring each
source to hold permits corresponding to the amount of pollution it emits.31 As long as
these policies will spread around the world and work well enough to make the market
price of certain products closer to their actual costs, liberalized trade will help transfer the
focus of international markets from industries with high input of environmental resources
to those with less environmental costs such as industry of services or technology.
In this chapter we mainly discussed the general relation between trade and
environment. Yet another important respect of the trade-environment debate is
30

See HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 2, Cha 3, 129-130 (quoting David Pearce et al., Blueprint
for a Green Economy 154-57 (1989)).
31
See Alan Carlin, U.S. E.P.A., the United States Experience with Economic Incentives to Control
Environmental Pollution, EPA-230-R-92-001, Cha 3, July 1992.
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practically, whether trade measures could be used as a leverage to reach specific
environmental purpose both domestically and internationally under a multilateral trading
system. Considering the critical role of WTO in trade liberalization and disputes
settlement in environment-related trade issues, we will use WTO as an example to
discuss this practical issue in the following chapter.

20

CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE OF WTO IN ADDRESSING THE TRADE-ENVIRONMENT ISSUE
In 1991, a dispute settlement panel under the old GATT concluded that the United
States violated its GATT obligations for its embargo on tuna caught by fishing methods
causing high dolphin mortality.32 Since this well-known Tuna-Dolphin case, the decisions
or actions of WTO/GATT on environment-related trade issues have kept attracting the
attentions, if not only critics, of both trade specialists and environmentalists. Has WTO
provided chances for the greening of international trade so that to achieve “the objective
of a sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and
to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and
concerns at different levels of economic development”33, which has given color, texture
and shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO agreement
generally and under the GATT 1994 particularly? Before these issues are discussed, a
brief overview of the history and the treaty structure of the WTO/GATT system and the
different types of environmental measures that may raise WTO concerns under these
treaties will assist a better understanding of the materials that follows.
A brief overview
1. The history34:
32

See United States –Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, DS21/R – 39S/155, September
3, 1991[hereinafter Tuna 1].
33
JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ALAN O. SYKES, JR., DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, preamble, para.1, at 3 [hereinafter Documents Supp.]
34
See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY AND ALAN O, SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, American Casebook Series, Cha 6, 209-210 (4th ed., 2002).
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With the original idea to create a broader international organization to be named the
“International Trade Organization” (ITO), a full preparatory conference convened in
Geneva from April to October 1947. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was drafted at the Geneva conference, simultaneously with the tariff
negotiations and the work on the ITO charter. The basic idea for the General Agreement
was to embody the results of the tariff negotiations and also include some of the general
protective clauses to prevent evasion of the tariff commitments, as a subsidiary
agreement under the ITO Charter. However, though the General Agreement was accepted
and applied through “Protocol of Provisional Application” (PPA) soon after the
conference, the ITO was dead due to the persistent resistance from the Congress of the
United States, and thus the GATT became the central organization for coordination
national policies on international trade, a role it was not intended to perform. Due to this
troubled history, the GATT was crippled in many ways and faced many problems. As a
result, at the end of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1994, a new and betterdefined international organization and treaty structure was created to carry forward
GATT’s work.
2. The treaty structure35and potential trade-environment conflicts under these treaties.
GATT 1947&1994: the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff, as amended and
changed through the Uruguay Round, embraces a variety of treaty instruments and
provides an important code of rules regulating international trade. With the objective to
liberalize trade, one of the core rules in the GATT is to constrain governments from
imposing or continuing a variety of measures that restrain or distort international trade,
including tariffs (Article II), quotas, internal taxes and regulations, subsidy and dumping
35
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practices and other non-tariff measures (Article XI) that distort trade. At the core of the
General Agreement are two nondiscrimination principles: the most-favored-nation
principle and the national treatment principle. The most-favored-nation principle of
Article I provides equal treatment of “like products” originating or destined for all other
contracting parties. The national treatment principle of Article III provides equal
treatment between domestic and imported products. The General Agreement also has a
number of exceptions, most of which are provided under Article XX. Trade-related
environmental measures regulating production process that will not affect the
characteristics of the products produced such as trade restriction on shrimp caught at the
risk of high mortalities of sea turtles are most controversial under the General Agreement.
Because all the obligations above point to “like products”, the determination of which is
mainly based on the characteristics of product itself, such environmental measures will
constitute violation of the obligations under the General Agreement for providing
different treatment for “like products” unless they are justified by any particular
exception under Article XX.
TBT&SPS: Through the Uruguay Round, a number of side agreements on 12 topics
ranging from agriculture to preshipment inspection were created. The Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, two of these side agreements that have direct environmental
implication, regulate the application of technical regulations and standards, including
measures taken for health reasons and they are mutually exclusive: the SPS Agreement
deals with diseases, pests, disease-causing organisms, as well as additives, contaminants,
toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverage or feedstuffs, while the TBT
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applies to all other product standards. Both TBT and SPS seek to promote the use of
harmonized international standards among Members while allowing Members a certain
degree of freedom to set their own standards. Environmental measures related to the
characteristics of product itself including regulation of pesticide residues in food, taxes
on the lead content of fuels, standard for sanitary conditions in slaughterhouses are
covered under these two agreements.
GATS: The General Agreement on Trade in Services, created in the Uruguay Round,
regulates a broad range of different service sectors, such as banking, tourism insurance,
brokerage, tourism, etc. The GATS agreement is comparable to the GATT agreement,
which has counterpart provisions to MFN, national treatment and general exceptions.
TRIPS: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is
designed to require governments to ensure a certain minimum level of protection, both
substantively and procedurally, for patents, copyrights, industrial designs, trademarks,
business matters and similar matters. It also has clauses concerning MFN, national
treatment as well as exceptions for national security. TRIPS agreement embraces a
number of intellectual property rights with implication for environmental protection, such
as sui generis systems for plant variety protection. It may also be relevant to the transfer
and disseminating of environmental technology.
Along with the major substantive agreements above are the WTO Charter and the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), a document that established a new dispute
settlement system and has in effect played an important role in the trade and environment
issues. Under the DSU, when a dispute appears, the disputing parties are first asked to
enter consultation to seek a consensus solution. If this fails, as it always does, the WTO
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Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) establishes a panel to hear the dispute. The panel makes
its findings and submits an interim report to the parties and then to the DSB for final
adoption. The losing party may appeal to an Appellate Body for review of issue of law. A
dramatic difference between the current WTO dispute settlement system and the one
previously practiced under GATT is the panel and the Appellate Body reports are
automatically adopted unless the membership decides by consensus against adoption,
which is almost impossible in practice. This difference gives the new WTO dispute
settlement system a significant advantage of effectiveness and efficiency in handling
large numbers of disputes, including environment-related trade disputes, over other
international dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Finally it should be mentioned that a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)36
was established as the result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to
identify the relationships between trade and environmental measures and make
appropriate recommendations for modification of the rules of the multilateral trading
system when necessary. However, the CTE has failed to make any substantive action,
largely due to its consensus-based decision-making process, with which a decision can be
taken by a majority vote only after it has failed to be reached by consensus, and
amendments to GATT 1994 or the multilateral trade agreement require a two-thirds,
three-fourths or unanimous vote. Thus compared to the DSB, the role of CTE in the
trade-environment debate is quite limited.
Key trade-environment issues under WTO
1. The environmental exceptions to GATT- Article XX
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Article XX of GATT provides general exceptions to the GATT obligations, including
the three most substantive ones: most-favored-nation treatment obligation (MFN),
National Treatment obligation and prohibition on quantitative restriction37. Though the
word “environment” is not used, paragraph (b) and paragraph (g) of Article XX provide
member states chances to justify their environment-inspired measures that collide with
international trade:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
…
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
…
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption;…38
The language of Article XX was first touched and interpreted in the Tuna-Dolphin
case39 in 1991, which turned out to be a nightmare both for environmentalists and
GATT/WTO40. After 20 years, with the far reaching Standard Gasoline case in 199641,
37
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the Shrimp-Turtle case in199842 and the United State final success in the Shrimp-Turtle
case in 200243, great changes have taken place in the interpretation of Article XX.
1) A brief introduction of cases.
A. Tuan-Dolphin
In 1989, based on the recognition that the nets used to harvest tuna in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific (ETP) were causing a significant rate of injury and death to dolphins
entangled into the nets44, the United States revised the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972 (MMPA) with the stated goal that the incidental kill or serious injury of marine
mammals in the course of commercial fishing be reduced to insignificant levels
approaching zero. 45The MMPA required that United States fishermen and others
operating within the jurisdiction of the United States to use certain fishing techniques to
reduce the incidental taking of dolphin in the harvesting of fish, 46and the United States
Government ban the importation of commercial fish or products from any country that
failed to establish a dolphin-protection regime “comparable” to that of the United States.
In order to satisfy this requirement, foreign governments were required to prove to U.S.
authorities that the incidental dolphin harm caused by their tuna fleet during a
representative time period was no more than 1.25 times higher that the average taking by
the U.S. fleet during the same time period. 47In addition, the MMPA provided that
importation of certain tuna and tuna products from any “intermediary nation” shall also
41
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be prohibited, unless the intermediary nation proves that it too had acted to ban imports
of such tuna and tuna products from the country subject to the direct import embargo.48
In 1991, Mexico challenged the MMPA to the GATT, arguing that the measures
under the MMPA were quantitative restrictions on importation that were forbidden under
Article XI of GATT and also violated the National Treatment Obligation under Article
III. The United States argued that (1) these measures were internal regulations under
Article III: 4 and the Note Ad Article 349 and (2) even if these measures did violate
Article XI and Article II, they were justified by Article XX exceptions for protection of
animal life and conservation of exhaustible natural resources50. After finding that the
MMPA was in violation of Article III and Article XI since the restriction under MMPA
was based on the harvesting of tuna rather than the imported tuna as a product itself51, the
Panel came to examine, for the first time in the history of GATT, whether a trade
measure could be justified under Article XX. With the following findings, the Panel
concluded that the United States failed to justify the MMPA with Article XX:
a) The exceptions under Article XX should not be applied to measures that protect
human, animal, and plant life or health or conserve natural resources outside the
jurisdiction of the Contracting party taking the measure.
b) A limitation on trade based on such unpredictable conditions as linked to the actual
taking rate for United States fishermen during a particular period could not be regarded as
necessary to protect the health or life of animals under Article XX (b).
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c) Also, a limitation on trade based on unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as
being primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins and could not be considered as
“related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” under Article XX (g).52
The MMPA was challenged again by the European Union in 199453 and, with some
difference in the reasoning from the former panel, the new Panel came to the same
conclusion. And for both the two Tuna-Dolphin cases, the United States exercised its
right to block adoption of the panel decision in the GATT, which left the dispute legally
unresolved.
B. Reformulated Gasoline case:
Along with the two most criticized panel decisions of the Tuna-Dolphin cases came a
number of international efforts aimed at balancing the economic growth and
environmental goals, the most influential of which may be the “Agenda 21”from the Rio
Conference in 1992. The “Agenda 21” urged states to ensure that international trade and
environmental policies are “mutually supportive” with a view of “achieving sustainable
development,” and called on governments to clarify the relationship between GATT
provisions and multilateral environmental agreements. At the same time, a centralized,
independent World Trade Organization was established by the Uruguay Round of
negotiations in 1994, which included a new Preamble that expressly recognizes the
obligation of governments to act in accordance with the objective of “sustainable
development,” and to seek to “protect and preserve the environment”. The new WTO
established a permanent Committee on Trade and Environment to address environmental
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issues, and more important, it made great changes in the dispute settlement process and
established a new permanent tribunal, WTO Appellate Body. Exactly under such a
background came out one of the most far-reaching cases about Article XX in the
GATT/WTO history: the Reformulated Gasoline case.
In 1996, the Venezuelan and Brazilian governments challenged a United States
regulation (the “Gasoline Rule”) concerning the maximum levels of gasoline emissions
permissible in domestic and imported gasoline to the new WTO. The Gasoline Rule,
promulgated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act
with the aim to reduce air pollution in the United States established the reformulated
gasoline program and conventional gasoline program, both of which required changes in
the composition of gasoline sold to consumers, using 1990 as a baseline year. However,
the baseline establishment rules distinguished between foreign and domestic refiners:
domestic refiners were permitted to establish individual baselines with three methods,
while foreign refiners were generally not allowed to do so and were required instead to
use the statutory baseline established by the EPA.54 Venezuela and Brazil argued that the
Gasoline Rule unlawfully discriminated against imported gasoline and thus violated the
National Treatment obligation. The United States responded that the treatment accorded
to imported gasoline was “on the whole” no less favourable since the statutory standard
baseline for foreign refiners and the average of the sum of the individual baselines for
domestic refiners both corresponded to average gasoline quality in 1990 and thus the
domestic and imported gasoline was treated equally “overall”.55
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In addition, United States argued that even if the rule did violate the National
Treatment obligation, it was nevertheless justified under Article XX since it “was
primarily aimed” at conserving clean air and “necessary” to protect human, animal and
plant life against air pollution.56 The United States further explained that an individual
baseline for foreign refiners was not feasible for the goal of the Gasoline Rule because
the verification of the data submitted by foreign refiners on which a reliable individual
baseline can be established and the enforcement techniques such as criminal and civil
sanctions for false data would not be possible against foreign refiners located outside the
jurisdiction of the United States.57
Finding that the “no less favourable” treatment of Article III: 4 has to be applicable to
each individual case and less favourable treatment of particular imported products in
some instances could not be balanced by more favourable treatment in other instances,58
the panel rejected the US argument and concluded that the Gasoline Rule violated the
National Treatment obligation.
Noting that under the application of antidumping law, the United States permits
foreign companies to submit individual data, which was comparable to the foreign data in
this case, the Panel rejected the United States’ argument that individual baselines for
foreign refiners were not available and found that the baseline establishment method of
the Gasoline Rule was not “necessary” under Article XX (b).59 In addition, in the Panel’s
view, since the United States could have afforded treatment of imported gasoline
consistent with its Article III: 4 obligations without hindering its pursuit of conservation
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policies under the Gasoline Rule, the less favourable baseline establishments methods
were “not primarily” aimed at the conservation of natural resources under Article XX
(g).60
The United States appealed the panel finding that the Gasoline Rule was not justified
under the Article XX (g) exception, and thus the case came before the Appellate Body.61
This is exactly the first case before Appellate body. The final 25-page Appellate Body
report, which has been one of the landmarks in the history of the WTO disputes
settlement, readdressed some most controversial considerations by the Panel and
provided more flexible interpretations for the Article XX (g) and, more importantly, the
introductory clause of Article XX (the Chapeau).
In examining whether a trade measure could be justified under Article XX, the
Appellate body took a new two-tiered test: first, the provisional justification of the
particular exceptions- paragraphs (a) to (j); second, further appraisal of the same measure
under the Chapeau.62
The Appellate Body came to examine, first, whether the baseline establishment rules
fell within the terms of paragraph (g) of Article XX. Against the Panel’s reasoning
whether the “less favourable treatment” of imported gasoline was related to the
conservation of natural resources, the Appellate Body found it was the “measure”,
namely the baseline establishment rules as a whole that should be examined63. In
addition, the Appellate Body Found that within certain terms of paragraph (g), “related
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to” could not be interpreted as “primarily aimed at”64 and “in conjunction with” did not
require identical treatment of domestic and imported products, but rather “evenhandedness” in the imposition of restrictions65. Based on the findings above, the
Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s notion and concluded that the Gasoline Rule fell
within the terms of Article XX (g).
Then the Appellate Body came to examine whether the Gasoline Rule could pass the
test of the Chapeau, the purpose of which, in the view of the Appellate Body, was to
avoid abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules under the GATT
available in Article XX66. And the Appellate Body found that the United States had
failed: first, to explore adequate alternatives, including in particular cooperation with the
governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the administrative problems67;
second, to count the costs for foreign refiners that would result from the imposition of
statutory baselines68. Since the resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was
not merely inadvertent or unavoidable, the Appellate Body concluded that the baseline
establishment rules in the Gasoline Rule, in their application, constituted “unjustifiable
discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade” that is prohibited
under the Chapeau and thus were not entitled to the justifying protection afforded by
Article XX as a whole.69
C. Shrimp-Turtle
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Beginning in 1987, the United States issued a series of regulations requiring U.S.
shrimp trawl vessels to use approved “turtle-excluder devices” (TEDs) in all areas where
there was a risk of interaction with the protected sea turtle species. In 1989, the United
States enacted Section 609 of the Endangered Species Act, which called on the Secretary
of State to initiate international negotiations for the purpose of entering into treaties to
protect the endangered sea turtles. In addition, Section 609 imposed a ban on shrimp
imports from states that failed to establish a sea turtle protection program “comparable”
to that of the United States, which took effect in May of 1991. However, the Department
of State issued guidelines providing that the ban applied only to fourteen countries in the
Caribbean/Western Atlantic region, granting these countries a three-year period in which
to phase-in measures to avoid the ban. In December 1995, the Court of International
Trade issued a decision ruling against the guidelines and directed the Department of the
State to impose the ban worldwide within the next four months. The latter complied the
ruling in April 1996. Four countries (India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand) that were
subject to the new ban, but had previously been exempted from the ban under the old
guidelines, filed a WTO complaint, claiming the United States import ban under Section
609 was quantitative restriction eliminated under Article XI:1. Once again the United
States claimed Article XX (b) and (g) as defense.70 In examining whether the import ban
under Section 609 was justified by Article XX, the Panel recalled the finding against
unilateralism of the Panel in Tuna Dolphin 2 that:
If Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to deviate from the
obligations of the General Agreement by taking implement policies, including
conservation policies, within their own jurisdiction, the basic objectives of the General
70
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Agreement would be maintained. If however Article XX were interpreted to permit
contraction parties to take trade measures so as to force other contraction parties to
change their policies within their jurisdiction, including their conservation policies, the
balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties, in particular the right of
access to markets, would be seriously impaired. Under such an interpretation the General
Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among contracting
parties.71
In the light of this analysis, the Panel found that Section 609, as applied, conditioned
access to the US market for a given product on the adoption by exporting Members of
conservation policies that the United States considers to be comparable to its own terms
of regulatory programmes and incidental taking and accordingly the measure constituted
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail
forbidden by the Chapeau and thus was not permitted under Article XX.72
The United States appealed and the Appellate Body began its analysis of Article XX
with an overall rejection of the reasoning process of the Panel.73
The appellate Body first reaffirmed the two-tiered analysis of Article XX,
emphasizing that the sequence of steps was the reflection of the fundamental structure
and logic of Article XX, not inadvertence or random choice. Thus the panel’s
disregarding the specific exceptions of Article XX (b) and (g) in favor of the Chapeau
was inappropriate.74 Moreover, the Appellate Body held that in interpreting the language
of Article XX, the Panel should look at the purpose and object of Article XX itself and
71
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maintaining the WTO multilateral trading system was not a right or an obligation and
could not be employed to interpret the Chapeau.75
Finally, the Appellate Body rejected the notion of the Panel that WTO members may
not unilaterally prescribe conditions for access to their markets, noting that conditioning
access to a Member’s domestic market on exporting Members’ compliance or adoption of
policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member, in which important and
legitimate domestic policies have been embodied, may be a common aspect of measures
falling within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX, and
the interpretation of the Panel would render most of the specific exceptions of Article XX
inutile.76
After reversing the Panel’s findings, the Appellate Body came to examine the
justification of Section 609 under Article XX. Appellate Body came to the first tier of the
analysis and found that Section 609, in its general design and structure, was a measure
relating to the conservation of sea turtles since the import ban was imposed on shrimp
that have been harvested with commercial fishing technology which may adversely affect
sea turtles and excluded the shrimp harvested under conditions that did not adversely
affect sea turtles or within the jurisdiction of the certified countries.77 Moreover, Section
609 was an even-handed measure since the United States shrimp trawlers were also
required to use approved TEDs where there was a likelihood of intercepting sea turtles
and the penalties for violations included civil and criminal sanctions78. Thus, the
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Appellate Body concluded that Section 609 was characterized as provisionally justified
under the terms of Article XX (g).
However, the Appellate Body found that the implementation of Section 609
constituted “unjustifiable” and “arbitrary” discrimination and thus failed to satisfy the
second tier of the analysis, namely the Chapeau. The Appellate Body based its conclusion
on both substantive and procedural considerations:
First, though the statue of Section 609 itself permitted imports from states with
comparable regulation regimes79, in implementing Section 609, the United States not
only failed to engage in serious negotiations for the protection of sea turtles with relative
countries80, but also required other WTO Members to adopt an essentially identical
regulatory program as that applied to the United States shrimp trawl vessels excluding all
shrimp caught in waters of countries that had not been certified by the United States
from the U.S. market, even those caught by using methods identical to those employed in
United States81. This suggested to the appellate body that the application of the measure
was more concerned with effectively influencing WTO Members to adopt essentially the
same regime as that applied by United States, rather than to protect sea turtles.82
Second, the certification processes followed by the United States in applying Section
609 was neither transparent nor predictable83 and it did not provide foreign interests any
opportunity to be heard, to receive a written, reasoned decision, or to respond to
arguments against them84. Such a lack of transparency and procedural fairness of the
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application of Section 609 reflected that Section 609, as it applied, was a measure of
“arbitrary discrimination” under the Chapeau.
Finally, the Appellate Body concluded that Section 609, though recognized as
legitimate under paragraph (g) of Article XX, had been applied against the requirement of
the Chapeau and thus did not qualify for the exemption of Article XX.85
As a response to the Appellate Body Report, on July 8 1999, the United States
Department of State issued Revised Guidelines for the implementation of Section 60986
and submitted it to the DSB. The Revised Guidelines introduced more flexibility in
considering the comparability of foreign programs and the US program by, for example,
providing criteria with which a country may be certified on the basis of having a
regulatory programme not involving the use of TEDs87. Moreover increased the
transparency and predictability of the certification process by providing foreign interests
a timetable and procedures within which review by the Department of the State of the
relative information was available by request of the harvesting countries88 and their
special concerns and situations could be taken into account in decision-making of the
certifications89. As a result, when challenged again by Malaysia to WTO in 2001, Section
609 with the Revised Guidelines for the implementation was finally upheld by the Panel
and Appellate Body in 200290. This is the first time in the history of WTO disputes
settlement that a trade-related environmental measure was justified under Article XX.
2) Interpreting Article XX: WTO’s effort to green international trade and the GATT
85
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The language of Article XX is so general that whether an environmental trade
measure can be justified under Article XX usually depends on how it is interpreted by the
Panel or the Appellate body of WTO. With both determination and discretion of WTO in
opening the door for environment-inspired trade measures, the interpretation of Article
XX by the Panel or the Appellate body in different cases may differ from one another or
even be in conflicts. The following are the main focuses of controversy.
A. The jurisdiction of paragraphs (b) and (g):
Non-extraterritorialÆ No territorial limitationÆ “sufficient nexus”
Is there any jurisdictional limitation on the application of Article XX? Should the
“human, animal or plant life or health” under paragraph (b) or the “exhaustible natural
resources” under paragraph (g) be limited to be within the territory of the country
invoking Article XX? These questions first appeared in the two Tuna-Dolphin cases and
to some extent are still left in doubt since, not only the plain language of Article XX itself
does not give any answers to these questions, but also the theories about the jurisdiction
in international law are distinct and controversial. Under public international law, there
are several relative principles about the jurisdiction of a state: (a) the territorial principle
that the state may control activities or resources within its territory, which has received
universal recognition; (b) the nationality principle that a state may control the activities of
its own citizens, no matter whether inside or outside its territory, which is limited by
many states; (c) the passive personality principle that a state may have jurisdiction over
aliens for acts abroad harmful to its nationals, which is the least justifiable of the various
bases of jurisdiction.91 In Tuna-Dolphin 1, the Panel, which seemed to be in favor of the
territorial principle, addressed this issue in the light of “the drafting history of Article XX
91
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(b), the purpose of this provision, and the consequences that the interpretations proposed
by the parties would have for the operation of the General Agreement as a whole”92. It
also found that “the concerns of the drafters of Article XX focused on the use of sanitary
measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction
of the importing country”93, and with the broad interpretation, the General Agreement
would “then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting
parties”94, thus implicitly denying the extraterritorial application of the provision.
However, such reasoning was rejected completely in Tuna-Dolphin 295. Against the
previous panel’s finding, the Panel of Tuna-Dolphin 2 found that in the light of the
Vienna Convention for the treaty interpretation, the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion could only be permitted as supplementary means of
interpretation under limited conditions96. Even if it could be used in this certain case, the
Panel found the statements and drafting changes made during the negotiation of the
General Agreement did not provide clear support for any particular contention on the
question of the jurisdiction limitation of paragraph (g)97 and thus could not support the
conclusion that the provisions of Article XX (g) apply only to policies related to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources located within the territory of the
contracting party.98 Then, with the further considerations that: (1) the text of Article XX
(g) does not spell out any limitation on the location of the exhaustible natural resources to
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be conserved; (2) measures with respect to things located, or actions occurring, outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure could in principle be taken
under other paragraphs of Article XX and other Articles of the General Agreement, such
as Article XX (e), which relates to products of prison labour; (3) under general
international law, a state may in particular regulate the conduct of its fishermen, or of
vessels having its nationality or any fishermen on these vessels, with respect to fish
located in the high seas,99the Panel concluded that the United States’ policy to conserve
dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean fell within the range of the policies covered
by Article XX (g). Thus, the Panel appeared to accept that Article XX could have
extraterritorial reach, in so far as under the limitation of international law.100 In this case,
the Panel’s conclusion seemed to be based, in effect, on the active personality
principle.101
In the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Appellate body took a different approach in addressing
this issue. Rather than discussing whether there is a jurisdictional limitation for the
measures under Article XX, it provided a new standard, the “sufficient nexus” between
the state invoking Article XX and the involved environmental resources.102 In reaching
the conclusion that there was a sufficient nexus between the sea turtles and the United
States, the Appellate Body considered that: sea turtles, as highly migratory animals, pass
in and out of waters subject to the rights of jurisdictions of various coastal states and the
high sea, the sea turtle species covered by Section 609 all occur in waters within the
jurisdiction of the United States, and no exclusive ownership is claimed over sea turtles
99
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in the ocean.103 With such a concern, dolphins, whales, and other migratory animals that
occur within a state’s jurisdiction could be considered to have a sufficient nexus with the
state. The ozone layer may also fall within the range of paragraph (g) as a certain kind of
exhaustible natural resource since it does not belong to any state but exists in the
atmosphere of every state. Thus the requirement of “sufficient nexus” appears to be more
flexible and encompass a broader range of environmental policies.
B. Paragraph (g): the understanding of “relating to”, “exhaustible natural resources”, and
“in conjunction with”
“Relating to”: “substantial relationship” rather than “primarily aimed at”
A principle difference between paragraph (b) and (g) is that they use different
standards to test the relation between the given trade measure and the purpose of the
measure: “necessary” for the former and “relating to” for the later. Though the exact
meaning of “relating to” is unknown, it seems to be less strict than the meaning of
“necessary”. However, in the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Panel considered that to
fall within paragraph (g), the given measure must be “primarily aimed at”104 the
conservation of natural resources, which appeared “to have applied the ‘necessary’ test
not only in examining the baseline establishment rules under Article XX (b), but also in
the course of applying Article XX (g)”105. As a result, the finding of the Panel was
reversed by the Appellate body. The Appellate Body, in the light of the Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) that “a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
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of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”106, found that the
policies and interests embodied in Article XX and its object and purpose could only be
interpreted on a case-to-case basis, “by careful scrutiny o the factual and legal context in
a given dispute, without disregarding the words actually used”107. It further pointed out
that “primarily aimed at” was not itself treaty language and should not be used as a
simple litmus test for inclusion or exclusion from paragraph (g)108. Then the Appellate
Body, considering that without the baseline establishment rules, the scrutiny and
monitoring of compliance with the Gasoline Rule would be impossible and the objective
of the Gasoline Rule, preventing further air pollution, would be frustrated, concluded that
the relationship between the baseline establishment rules and the conservation of clean air
was substantial and not incidental or inadvertent.109 This “substantial relationship”
interpretation was further reaffirmed by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case,
which found that the means and ends relationship between Section 609 and the United
States’ policy of conserving the sea turtles was a close and real one and a relationship that
was “every bit as substantial as” that between the baseline establishment rules and the
conservation of clean air in the Reformulated Gasoline case.110
Another important question about the phrase “relating to”, the answer of which
contributed to the difference between the findings of the Panel and the Appellate Body in
the Reformulated Gasoline case, is what should be examined under the “relating to”
requirement of paragraph (g). The Panel examined whether the “less favorable treatment”
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of imported gasoline was related to the conservation of clean air in the United States111
and thus came to the conclusion against the United States. On the contrary, the Appellate
Body found that it was the “measure”, i.e. the baseline establishment rules as a whole that
should be examined under paragraph (g)112, and criticized the Panel’s referring to its
conclusion on Article III: 4 instead of the measure in issue as “turning Article XX on its
head”113. The Appellate Body further pointed out that the measure, i.e. the baseline
establishment rules should not only be examined as a whole, but also be examined in the
light of the other requirements of the Gasoline Rule, since the provisions of the baseline
establishment rules could not be understood if scrutinized strictly by themselves, totally
divorced from other sections of the Gasoline Rule which constituted part of the context of
these provisions.114
“Exhaustible natural resources”: both living and non-living resources
Whether animals such as dolphins or turtles can constitute “exhaustible natural
resources” is less controversial than other issues under paragraph (g). Rather, the
approach with which WTO/GATT addresses this issue has played a more important role.
In the Shrimp-Turtle 1, the Appellate Body, taking into account not only the text of
Article XX (g) and the preamble of the WTO Agreement, but also the recent
acknowledgement by the international community of the importance of concerted
bilateral or multilateral action to protect living natural resources as well as the frequent
references to natural resources as embracing both living and non-living resources by the
modern international conventions such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
111
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Law of the Sea (UNCLS), found that measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources,
whether living or non-living, may fall within Article XX (g).115 This reasoning process of
the Appellate Body “has drawn the most praise from commentators for its new-found
sensitivity to environmental considerations and welcome reliance on public international
law outside the WTO”116.
“In conjunction with”: the requirement of “even-handedness”
The main issue under the second clause of paragraph (g), “if such measure are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”, is how
to understand the requirement of “in conjunction with”, and whether, for example,
identical treatment for domestic and imported products is implied under this requirement.
These questions did not get addressed until the Reformulated Gasoline case. The Panel
did not deal with this issue specifically with respect to the baseline establishment rules
since it had earlier failed to past the test of “relating to”. But the Panel did make a general
finding that a trade measure could only be considered to be made effective “in
conjunction with” domestic production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at rendering
these restrictions117. This finding did not give any light on the issue here since, as
discussed above, the phrase “primarily aimed at” was itself not treaty language and need
further interpretation. Also, that the Panel used the same standard for the two different
but both important terms, “relating to” and “in conjunction with” under paragraph (g)
made its finding far from acceptable.
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Opposite to the Panel’s confusing, if not misleading, understanding of “in conjunction
with”, the Appellate Body gave a thorough, clear and precise interpretation on this issue.
In the light of the basic rule of treaty interpretation that the terms of a treaty are to be
given their ordinary meaning, the Appellate body found that the second clause of
paragraph (g) referred to governmental measures like baseline establishment rules being
“promulgated or brought into effect” “together with” restrictions on domestic production
or consumption of natural resources, namely, in the view of the Appellate body, a
requirement of “even-handedness” in the imposition of restrictions upon the production
or consumption of exhaustible natural resources.118 In addition, the Appellate Body made
special emphasis on understanding the requirement of “even-handedness” that first, there
was no textual basis for requiring “identical” treatment of domestic and imported
products119 and second, due to the difficulty in determining causation in both domestic
and international law and the substantial period of time before the effect of a given
measure may be observable in the field of conservation of natural resources, an empirical
effects test should not be used for the availability of paragraph (g)120.
With these findings, the report of the Appellate Body did make a salutary distinction.
With the Appellate Body’s more open-minded understanding of the second clause of
paragraph (g), an import restriction measure with the policy goal of conservation of
natural resources need neither to be companied with an identical treatment on domestic
production or consumption, nor to have currently observable effect on the conservation
goal to be justified under Article XX (g).
C. The Chapeau: drawing a line of equilibrium
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From a simple, long-untouched piece of language, to the focus of all the concerns or
critics, the role changing of the Chapeau in the implementation and interpretation of
Article XX may be the best reflection of the changing role WTO/GATT has played in the
trade-environment agenda. Before the report of the Appellate Body in the Reformulated
Gasoline case, the language of the Chapeau was barely touched since none of the
concerned measures, such as the ban on imported tuna product or the baseline
establishment rules had satisfied the requirement of the particular provision of paragraph
(b) or (g). Only after the Appellate body in the Reformulated Gasoline case concluded
that the baseline establishment rules fell within the terms of the paragraph (g), did both
the environmentalists and the free traders get a chance to know how a trade-related
environmental measure could pass the test of the Chapeau and finally be justified under
Article XX.
In the light of its expression, all the exceptions under Article XX are qualified by the
Chapeau, the introductory provision, which sets up two tests for a given measure:
a. Whether it is applied in a manner that could constitute arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, and,
b. Whether it is applied in a manner that could constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade.
Beginning with the report of the Appellate body, the main issues around which the
interpretation of the Chapeau is developed are listed below:
(1) The relation between the Chapeau and a particular exception in application
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In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body found that to be protected by
Article XX, the measure at issue must first, come under one of the particular exceptions,
namely paragraph (a) to (j), and second, further satisfy the requirement of the Chapeau.121
In the view of the Appellate Body, the purpose and object of the Chapeau was the
prevention of “abuse”, a principle that while the particular exceptions of Article XX may
be invoked as a matter of legal right, they should not be applied to frustrate or defeat the
legal obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General
Agreement and thus must be applied with due regard both to the legal duties of the party
claiming the exception and the legal right of the other parties concerned.122 This twotiered test provided by the Appellate Body in the Reformulated Gasoline case was
reaffirmed in the first Shrimp-Turtle case, in which the Appellate Body rejected the
Panel’s reversing of the sequence of the two-tiered test and found that the sequence of the
steps set out in the Reformulated Gasoline case was the reflection of the fundamental
structure and logic of Article XX, not inadvertence or random choice.123And the
Appellate Body, based on the understanding of the purpose and object of the Chapeau by
the Appellate Body in the Reformulated Gasoline case, summarized the task of
interpreting and applying the Chapeau as “marking out a line of equilibrium” between the
right to invoke an exception under Article XX and the other rights under the substantive
provisions of the GATT 1994124.
(2) The subject of the two-tiered test under the Chapeau: the measure itself or the
manner in which the measure is applied?
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As early as in the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body already answered
this question clearly with the finding that the Chapeau addresses, “not so much the
questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that
measure is applied”125. However, this general but important point was ignored by the
Panel in the first Shrimp-Turtle case, which concluded that Section 609 failed to satisfy
the requirement of the Chapeau simply because it was a measure conditioning access to
its market upon the adoption by exporting Members of certain policies126. The finding
was soon reversed by the following Appellate Body. In revering the Panel’s finding, the
Appellate Body first recalled its finding above in the Reformulated Gasoline case and
then further pointed out that the general design of a measure was distinguished from the
application of the measure and should be examined in the course of determining whether
that measure fell within any particular exception of Article XX following the Chapeau,127
namely the first tier of the test of the Chapeau. Thus the Panel’s repeated focus on the
design of Section 609 in examining its consistency with the Chapeau of constituted error
in legal interpretation.
(3) The qualification of unilateralism: whether a trade measure is disqualified by the
Chapeau simply because it’s unilateral characteristics?
Against international cooperation through multilateral agreements among different
countries, unilateralism, where a country takes unilateral measure in order to affect other
countries for various purposes, is always regarded as inappropriate in the field of
international law, including international environmental law. As a multilateral trading
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system, WTO/GATT used to hold a very negative attitude toward unilateralism,
especially when it comes to measures conditioning market access for a given product to
force exporting countries to adopt certain policies. In Tuna-Dolphin 2, the Panel found
that permitting contracting parties to take trade measures so as to force other contracting
parties to change their policies within their jurisdiction would seriously impair the
balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties and the multilateral
framework for trade established under the General Agreement; thus Article XX should
not be interpreted to do so.128 This spirit was followed by the Panel in the Reformulated
Gasoline case, which further noted that language of the DSU also stresses the primacy of
the multilateral system and rejects unilateralism as a substitute129 and the security and
predictability of trade relations under the WTO system would be threatened if Members
were allowed to do so130. However, this traditional attitude has been changed by the
Appellate Body in the first Shrimp-Turtle case. While reversing the Panel’s finding, the
Appellate Body found that though maintaining the multilateral trading system is a
fundamental premise underlying the WTO agreement, it is neither a right nor an
obligation, nor could it be used as an interpretative rule in the appraisal of a given
measure under the Chapeau.131 On the contrary, in the view of the Appellate Body,
conditioning market access on the exporting Members’ adoption of or compliance with
policies unilaterally prescribed by importing Members may be a common aspect of
measures falling within the scope of the particular exceptions under Article XX 132. Thus
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the Appellate Body has put it clearly on the record of the history of WTO that at least
under Article XX, the availability of unilateralism is no longer a question.
(4) The understanding of “arbitrary discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and
“disguised restriction”
In the Reformulated Gasoline case, the Appellate Body pointed out that “arbitrary
discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised restrictions” should be
read side-by-side since one may amount to another when taken in international trade
under Article XX and thus the determination of the presence of “arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination” may also be taken into account in determining the presence of “disguised
restriction.133 This finding of the Appellate Body is much more a general understanding
than a detailed, operational standard. However, in the second Shrimp-Turtle case, the new
factors below about Section 609 with the Revised Guidelines, which the Panel took into
specific consideration in the second Shrimp-Turtle case, may throw some light on this
issue:
The improved flexibility of the application of Section 609
Compared to the Section 609 in the first Shrimp-Turtle case, the Section 609 with the
Revised Guideline, as it applied, was more flexible, since:
a) The conservation programmes of exporting countries are no longer required to be
“essentially the same” as that of the programmes of United States but only comparable in
effectiveness;
b) The importation of shrimp harvested in other manners or under other
circumstances may be allowed as long as the manner or circumstance does not pose a
threat of the incidental taking of sea turtle; and
133
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c) The importation of shrimp harvested by vessels using TEDs is allowed, even if the
exporting nation has not been certified pursuant to Section 609.134
The transparency in decision-making process for certification
Under the Revised Guidelines, during the decision-making process, exporting
countries may request judicial review or reconsideration of the decisions when their
certifications are denied.135
Sustained pace of the negotiations and the prospect of their conclusion, the effective
contribution of the United States in the context of these negotiations
The panel considered that the United States made sustained and efficient scientific,
diplomatic and financial contribution in a number of international conventions for the
conservation of migratory species, such as the negotiation of the Memorandum of
Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles and their
Habitats of the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia.136 Here the Panel specially
emphasized that though good faith efforts in these negotiations were required, the United
States should not be held exclusively responsible for reaching an agreement.137
Other “serious good faith efforts” such as technology transfer made to relative countries
by United States since the adoption of the reports of the original Panel and the Appellate
body.138
It was on the basis of the above considerations that the Panel concluded that the
United States has demonstrated that “Section 609 is not applied so as to constitute a
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disguised restriction on trade”139 and thus “is justified under Article XX of the GATT
1994 as long as the conditions… in particular the ongoing serious, good faith efforts to
reach a multilateral agreement, remain satisfied”140.
In summary, there is not a detailed, operational standard for what constitutes
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or “disguised restrictions”. The conclusion of
the Panel or the Appellate Body about whether a concerned measure would satisfy the
requirement of the Chapeau of Article XX should be made on a case-by-case basis, in the
light of the purpose of the Chapeau, drawing a line of equilibrium between a Member’s
right under Article XX and its obligation and other members’ rights under substantive
provisions of the GATT. As the Appellate Body in the first Shrimp-Turtle case pointed
out, the location of the line, “is not fixed and unchanging”141 and it “moves as the kind
and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases
differ”142.
3) Evaluating the development of Article XX
The attitude of WTO/GATT, as a multilateral trade system, towards a trade-related
environmental measure that is best reflected in the understanding and interpretation of
Article XX, is not unchanging. When the GATT was crafted more than 50 years ago, the
connection of environmental protection with the development of human beings was not
available, and the concept of environmental law or international environmental law was
not mature. Along with the growing and developing of international environmental law
and a worldwide acknowledgement of the status of the environment, the attitude of the
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WTO/GATT is evolving. And the language of Article XX of the GATT, which was once
interpreted narrowly, must be, as the Appellate Body of the first Shrimp-Turtle case
pointed out, read in the light of the contemporary concerns of the community of nations
about the protection and conservation of the environment143. And from Tuna-Dolphin to
Shrimp-Turtle, it is not hard to find out that the Dispute Settlement Body, recalling the
explicit recognition by WTO Members of the objective of sustainable development, is
making efforts towards a more flexible interpretation of Article XX, and a more
environment-friendly attitude of the whole multilateral trade regime of WTO: a unilateral
trade-related environmental measure is no longer unacceptable under WTO, the
jurisdictional justification of the measure is not so much a question, and most important,
the focus of the requirement of Article XX has shifted, from whether the challenged
measure itself falls within the provision of Article XX (b) or (g), to whether the
implementation of the measure can be justified by the Chapeau. In short, though there is
still a long way to go to the final equilibrium and reconciliation between the environment
and trade interest, WTO has moved significantly toward such a great goal and offered
chances for a trade-related environmental measure to be justified by Article XX, with
which environmentalists can expect to continue winning battles in this trade-environment
debate.
2. “Like Products” and “Process and Production Methods” (PPMs)
Under GATT, a country cannot discriminate between domestic products and imported
products or imported products from different countries only when such products are “like
products”. As a result, the meaning of “like products” turns to be very important, for
environmental regulations often seeks to distinguish between similar products on the
143
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basis of their environmental impacts. The main controversy between trade specialists and
environmentalists on this issue is whether products with similar characteristics, but
produced with different process or production methods, can be treated as like products
under GATT.
Generally there are two kinds of PPMs: PPMs that are directly related to the
characteristics of the products concerned and PPMs that generally do not affect the
products produced144. For the former, examples are pesticide used on food crops that
produce residues in food products, cattle raised on growth hormones produce meat with
hormone residues, unsanitary conditions in slaughterhouse result in meat that may be
contaminated by disease-carrying organisms, and etc. Such PPMs are covered by SPS
and TBT agreements145 under WTO and states may regulate such PPMs as long as they
adhere to the disciplines in those Agreements.
However, whether the other PPMs, are permissible under WTO is in doubt. Before
WTO, the GATT restricted the determination of likeness on the physical characteristics
of concerned products and whether these products are produced in different PPMs should
not be taken into account in this issue146. Under the new WTO, the approach first taken in
the Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments147 has been developed by
several panels and the Appellate Body. The approach now mainly consists of four
criteria: the properties, nature and quality o the products, the end-use of the products,
consumers’ taste and habits, in other words, consumers’ perceptions and behaviour in
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respect of the products, and the tariff classification of the products. Though still, the
PPMs issue was not addressed directly here, the introduction of consumers’ perceptions
and behaviour in analyzing the likeness of the products seem to give chances to the
consideration of PPMs, since more environmentally-conscious consumers may see
environment-safe PPMs as an important factor in their choice of products.
Recently, a small step has been taken towards a more flexible analysis by the
Appellate Body in the EU Asbestos case148. In this case, the Appellate Body furthered the
approach above to four categories of “characteristics”: the physical properties of the
products, the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or similar enduse, the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as alternative means of
performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand, and
international classification of the products for tariff purpose149.
However, the Appellate Body pointed out that these criteria or characteristics are
“simple tools to assist in the task of sorting and examining the relevant evidence”150 and
are “neither a treaty-mandated nor a closed list of criteria that will determine the legal
characterization of products”151. Thus they only serve as a framework for analyzing the
likeness, which can aid but not dissolve the duty or the need to examine, in each case, all
of the pertinent evidence.152 In this way, the Appellate Body reaffirmed the finding in the
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages case that no one approach will be appropriate for all cases
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and an assessment utilizing an unavoidable element of individual, discretionary judgment
has to be made on a case-by-case basis153.
For the application of the four-criteria approach above, if adopted in an analysis, the
Appellate Body required that a Panel should examine “the evidence relating to each of
those four criteria” and weigh “all of that evidence, along with other evidence, in making
an overall determination”154.
The most innovative part of this report may be the claim of competitiveness as the
fundamental for the determination of “likeness” under Article III. In its own words,
As products that are in a competitive relationship in the marketplace could be affected
through treatment of import “less favourable” than the treatment accorded to domestic
products, it follows that the word “like” in Article III: 4 is to be interpreted to apply to
products that are in such a competitive relationship. Thus, a determination of “likeness”
under Article III: 4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a
competitive relationship between and among products.155
With all the considerations above, this new approach to the “like-product”
determination is much welcomer to the PPMs supporters. The case-by-case analysis can
be applied to give appropriate deference to national political determinations, and the
requirement of weighing all of the evidence relating to each of the four criteria along with
other evidence makes it no longer appropriate to determine the likeness of products
merely on the basis of their physical characteristics. More importantly, the claim of
competitive relationship between or among products as the fundamental factor for the
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determination of “likeness” gives more chance to the consideration of PPMs in the course
of analysis, sinceince, with other things equal, whether the PPMs of given products have
environmental-negative impact will play a critical role in the competitiveness of these
products, as long as consumers do care about environment.
3. TBT and SPS: promote rather than require standards harmonization.
Currently the product standards and regulations in different countries may differ from
each other to a certain degree. Some of these distinctions are justified by differences in
economic and social circumstances. However, others may serve as non-tariff
impediments in international trade with the standards and regulations deliberately crafted
to impose a cost disadvantage on foreign competitors. There are two WTO agreements
specially addressing this issue: the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS), which applies in general to measures taken to protect human, animals and plant
life or health from certain specified risks, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT), which applies to the use of other technical regulations and standards. One
approach used by these Agreements to combat nontariff barriers is promoting the
harmonization of different product regulations and standards in the member states on the
basis of international standards.
Such an approach is criticized by some environmentalists, who argue that the
requirement of using international standards may force the downward harmonization of
environmental laws. However, after examining the provisions of these two agreements
carefully, we will conclude that such an argument is not reasonable, because while
promoting standards harmonization, SPS and TBT both allow states enough freedom to
set environmental standards higher than international standards.
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1) The right of Members to adopt or enforce measures or standards
In their preamble, both of the Agreements recognize the right of members to adopt or
enforce measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health156, or for
other purposes including the protection of environment157 as long as the application of
such measures, standards or regulations does not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised
restriction on international trade158. Put in another way, Members can apply higher
product standards as long as they are necessary to fulfill a justified purpose, such as the
protection of environment, and are not applied in a way aiming at disturbing international
trade.
2) Substantive provisions about a higher standard
A. SPS
The use of higher sanitary or phytosanitary protection is justified substantially under
the first part of Artcile3, paragraph 3:
Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which
result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be
achieved by measure based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or
recommendations, if there is a scientific justification or as a consequence of the
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be
appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8
of Article 5159…160
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The second part of this provision requires such measures shall not be inconsistent
with any other provisions of the Agreement161.
So for a member to justify a measure with a higher level under SPS, it has to provide
a scientific justification or risk assessment under Article 5 for such a measure.
Scientific justification: according to the footnote of Article 3.3, a scientific justification is
assumed if “on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific
information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member
determines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations are
not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection”162.
The “relevant provisions” here mainly include Article 2.2 and Article 5.7. Article 2.2
requires Members to maintain their measure with sufficient scientific evidence163 except
as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available
pertinent information, including that from the relevant international organizations
as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members. In
such circumstances, Member shall seek to obtain the additional information
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.164

160

SPS, supra note 145, art. 3.3.
See id.
162
Id. n.2.
163
See id. Art. 2.2.
164
Id. Art. 5.7.
161

60
This provision is usually considered as a reflection of the Precautionary Principle in
WTO. In the EC Hormones case165 about an EC prohibition of imports of meat and meat
products derived from cattle to which either the natural hormones or the synthetic
hormones (“MGA”) were administered for growth promotion purposes, European
Communities made an effort to use the Precautionary Principle directly as a defense for
the prohibition in its appeal166. Though the Appellate Body concluded that the principle
could not override the provisions under SPS, it showed an open mind in addressing the
relation between the Precautionary Principle and Article 5.7 and other provisions under
SPS. First, it affirmed that the Precautionary Principle is not only reflected in Article 5.7,
and also in the paragraph 6 of the preamble and in Article 3.3.167 Then, it pointed out that
a panel should, in the analysis of “sufficient scientific evidence”, “bear in mind that
responsible, representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence
and precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health
are concerned”168.
With these considerations, it is clear that Precautionary Principle does have a place in
the SPS agreement and in addition, it is required as guidance for a panel to analyze
relative cases under SPS. The only thing that you cannot do is to use Precautionary
Principle itself as an absolute defense for your measure. As the Appellate Body
concluded, the Precautionary Principle “does not, by itself, and without a clear textual
directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal principles…
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in reading the provisions of the SPS Agreement”169. This reasoning is desirable since the
meaning and application of the Precautionary Principle need further authoritative
formulation even in the field of international environmental law. And it is not reasonable
to put such a burden on WTO, as an international trade organization.
Risk assessment and the level of protection: a basic obligation of Members under SPS is
to base their measures on a risk assessment, which is addressed in detail in Article 5170.
Generally, in the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account scientific
evidence171, economic factors172 and other relative factors, as well as the objective of
minimizing negative trade effects173. For the level of protection to be appropriate,
Members are required to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions that result in
discrimination or disguised trade restrictions on international trade174 and to ensure the
measures are not more trade-restrictive than required175. And a measure is assumed not to
be more trade-restrictive than required, unless there is another measure reasonably
available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility to achieve the
appropriate level of protection176.
In the EC-hormones case above, the Appellate Body gave a rather flexible
interpretation of Article 5 and its application:
First, there is no quantitative requirement of risk. The Appellate body, against the
panel’s finding, emphasized that there is no quantitative requirement of risk, such as “a
minimum magnitude of risk” in risk assessment in the text of SPS. A panel is authorized
169
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only to determine whether an SPS measure is sufficiently supported or reasonably
warranted by the risk assessment, not whether there is a demonstration of certain risk in
the risk assessment.177
Second, there is no procedural requirement for the risk assessment. The Appellate
body rejected the panel’s requirement that the Member should actually take into account
a risk assessment when it enacted or maintained the SPS measure, and concluded that the
requirement of “basing on” under Article 5.1 is a substantive one, that there be a rational
relationship between the measure and the risk assessment. Particularly, it pointed out that
the Member does not have to carry out its own risk assessment. Rather, it can justify its
SPS measure by a risk assessment carried out by another Member or international
organization.178
Third, there is no requirement of “mainstream” scientific opinion. According to the
Appellate body report, Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must
necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific community. And
the risk assessment can set out both the prevailing view as well as the opinions of
scientists taking a divergent view and the existence of such divergence does not signal the
absence of a reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment,
especially where the risk is life-threatening. As a conclusion, the determination of the
presence or absence of the relationship can only be done on a case-to-case basis.179
Under such interpretation, to justify a SPS measure with a higher level of protection
by a risk assessment, the Member does not have to do actually risk assessment by itself;
does not have to show “identifiable risk” in the assessment, nor does the assessment have
177
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to reflect any mainstream scientific opinion. All it has to do is, when such a measure is
challenged before WTO and so required, to show the panel that there is a rational relation
between the measure and the risk assessment. In addition, the Appellant Body, reversing
the panel’s finding that the burden of proof under Article 3.3 was on European
Communities, reaffirmed that the complaining party should have to bear the burden of
proof at first under each Article of SPS, including Article 3.3.180 All these considerations
above are more than enough to show that a Member’s right to adopt a higher SPS
standard based on certain requirement of the SPS Agreement is substantively and
procedurally protected to a great extent.
TBT
The substantial provision about the use of international standard and the exception is
under Article2, paragraph 4:
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist
or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of
them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international
standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the
fulfillment of the legitimate objective pursued, for instance because of
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological
problems.181
The requirement for an exception here is less strict than the SPS Agreement.
Members can have their own standard without the international standard as a basis as
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long as the international standards are “ineffective or inappropriate” for the fulfillment of
the legitimate objective.
So far there is only one case about TBT before DSB, the EC-Sardines case182, which
mainly concerned a measure of European Communities prohibiting other species of
sardines rather than the one called “sardine pilchardus walbaum” marketed in EC as
preserved sardines183.
The most important conclusion of the report of the Appellate Body in this case is
about the burden of proof under Article 2.4184. The Appellate Body referring to the
conclusion in the EC-hormones case, concluded that the complaining party, in this case,
Peru bears the burden of proof. This means the member who complains about a given
technical regulation or standard of another member not justified under Article 2.4 should
provide evidence that the relevant international standard is “efficient” and “appropriate”
to fulfill the legitimate objective of the claimed member.
In addition, the Appellate Body gave some interpretation for the terms “legitimate
objective”, “ineffective” and “inappropriate”185. For the term “legitimate objectives”, the
Appellate Body reaffirmed the panel’s conclusion that it must cover all the objectives
explicitly mentioned in Article 2.3186, such as the protection of human health or safety,
animal or plant life or health, or the environment and at the same time it extends beyond
the list of Article 2.3.187 For the other two terms, the interpretation did not give much
light and may need further address in the future. However, with the conclusion about
182

European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, the report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS231/AB/R [hereinafter EC-Sardines]
183
See id. 1-4.
184
See id. 269-282.
185
See id. 285-286.
186
See TBT, supra note 145, art. 2.3.
187
See EC-Sardines, supra note 182, at 286.

65
burden of proof above and the flexibility compared to SPS of the language of TBT, we
can expect a even broader interpretation of Article 2.4 and its application may be given in
the near future.
With the analysis of the SPS and TBT Agreements above, we can conclude that 1)
there is no interference with the right of a member state itself to choose the level of
protection it wants to adopt regarding its own natural resources, environmental quality,
and the health and safety; 2) harmonization and the adoption of international standards
are encouraged but not mandated; 3) only the measure chosen to implement these
domestic policies will be subject to WTO review when they affect international trade, and
the tests employed set an appropriate balance between the accommodation of national
interests, on the one hand, and the need to police disguised trade restrictions, on the
other.188
4. NGOs’ participation: The transparency of WTO
Non-Governmental Organizations have played an important role in the development
of international environmental protection and even international environmental law.
Compared to governmental organizations, NGOs have the following advantages:
Technological advantage: the most powerful weapon of NGOs is the Internet, which
provides a vast opportunity for sharing experiences and mobilizing activists to push for
stronger environmental policies. With the control of Internet, NGOs make the once
officially restricted information available to everyone with a computer, thus affect public
opinion dramatically which forces policy-makers to think twice before any final decision.
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Also, the rich and low-cost recourse of expertise and knowledge of NGOs provides
analytical support for government officials in policy making.
Monitoring and improving compliance and implementation: the enforcement of most
international environmental agreements generally depends on national law and the
member states’ self-report. On the one hand, NGOs can serve as a watchdog and increase
the credibility of the relative reports by the governments, and, on the other, NGOs may
provide technical, professional and even economic support to improve the governments’
capacity in implementing international agreements, especially those in developing
countries.
Sounding the Alarm: the technological advantage and, more important, the independent
role of NGOs make NGOs more sensitive to any new potential threats to environment
and public health without the twist from the political pressure.
Recognizing these advantages of NGOs, some international environmental
agreements have explicitly provided that NGOs could be invited as observers in the
conferences of the parties.
Here comes the question: should and will WTO, an international trade organization
among governments devoted to promoting trade liberalization, welcome NGOs’
participation?
One direct beneficiary of the NGOs’ participation is the Dispute Settlement Body of
WTO. The members of the Panel or Appellate Body are mainly experts in the field of
international trade, which may not be capable enough in disputes involving
environmental considerations. With the advantages above, the NGOs’ participation will
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increase the authority of DSB and make the report of the Panel or Appellate Body more
acceptable to both the dispute parties and the publicity.
More important, the participation of NGOs in the whole WTO regime will promote to
a great extent the transparency and accountability of WTO. The unflattering and
inaccurate portrait of the old GATT as a secretive cabal of “faceless bureaucrats”189
painted by the environmental communities was largely due to the old GATT’s
indifference to public participation and ignorance of the power of NGOs. For the new
WTO, it is vital for the public to understand the aims of the WTO and to develop trust in
this organization. As WTO requires transparency in the member states’ implementation
of national trade law and decision-making, the transparency of WTO itself is and should
be claimed too. Otherwise WTO would still be considered as some instrument with which
big corporations hammer out deals secretly on the sacrifice of environmental interest and
would suffer the same fate as its precedent.
Fortunately, WTO seems to have learned the lesson from the old GATT and has
attempted to welcome NGOs. Exactly at the time of its establishment, WTO has provided
legal foundation for the NGOs’ participation in WTO:
“The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and
cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those
of the WTO.”190
This provision has drawn a clear line between WTO and the old GATT. Under such a
provision, whether NGOs can participate in WTO is no longer a question, but rather “in
what forms of consultation and cooperation are appropriate.”191
189
190
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Under this constitutional provision, WTO has made stable efforts towards more
participation by NGOs, despite constant criticism from WTO governments against the
involvement of NGOs192. Examples are informal sessions with NGOs by the Secretariat,
the General Council’s permitting NGOs to attend the WTO Ministerial Conference,
symposia sponsored by WTO with broad participation of NGOs and etc193. Recently the
most important development may be the accepting of Amicus Reports under DSB:
In the Shrimp-Turtle 1, the Panel received two documents called amicus briefs
submitted by non-governmental organizations in the course of the proceedings. Holding
that accepting non-governmental sources would be incompatible with the provisions of
the DSU as currently applied, the Panel did not take the documents into consideration.194
However, the Appellate Body reversed the findings, noting that accepting nongovernmental sources is not incompatible with the provisions of DSU. Rather, the panel
and appellate body have the discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to
reject information and advice submitted to it, whether requested or not, and “…that
authority, and the breadth thereof, is indispensably necessary to enable a panel to
discharge its duty imposed by Article 11 of the DSU to ‘make an objective assessment of
the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the
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applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements….’”195 The
Appellate body did accept three Amicus briefs attached to the submission of the United
States as well as one brief from CIEL(Center for Marine Conservation and the Center for
International Environmental Law).196 Though under such a finding, it’s still left to the
Panel or the Appellate Body to decide whether to accept amicus briefs or not, the
involvement of NGOs in WTO’s judicial function no doubt has been authorized.
With all these substantive actions above, as well as an official webpage offering
public access to full text of once-restricted WTO documents, from the basic WTO/GATT
agreements, the decisions and reports of panel and Appellate Body to the new
development of current WTO issues and a schedule of upcoming WTO events197, the
transparency and accountability of WTO has been increasing. As a result, the first Global
Accountability Report198 made by a group of experts from NGOs, universities and
international institutions has given high marks to the WTO, ranking it third in access to
online information, eighth on member control and fourth overall among 18 intergovernmental organizations, transnational corporations and international NGOs.
In conclusion, though NGOs’ participation in WTO is still in a limited and informal
form, especially in its executive and legislative functions199, WTO’s sincerity and
substantial efforts in inviting a broad public participation is undeniable and it should be
trusted to be able to make further achievement in transparency and accountability.
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Future issues
1. Environmental Amendment to the TRIMs agreement
Recognizing that restrictions on investors might impermissibly encourage the
purchase of domestic over imported goods, the TRIMs200(Trade related Investment
Measures) agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round to prohibit trade-related
investment measures that conflict with Article III or Article XI of GATT. Certain
domestic content restrictions and other restrictions on the ability of investors to import or
export are illustrated in the annex to TRIMs201. But nothing in TRIMs refers to effect of
global capital mobility on the environment. Though as discussed in the early part of this
article, there is not enough empirical support for the race-to-the bottom argument that
countries will be forced by the pressure from international competition to lower their
environmental standards in order to attract more foreign direct investment, at least to
decrease the hostility from environmentalists and show its concern of environmental
interests in every aspect of its current structure, WTO should make an amendment to the
TRIMs Agreement. A good model is Article 1114.2 of NAFTA:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing
domestic health, safety, or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not
waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such
measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or retention
in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that anther Party has
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offered such an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the
two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.202
The most acceptable point of this provision is that it doesn’t set up any substantive
requirement for the standard of environmental protection in the host countries of FDI.
Rather, it provides a legal foundation for the affected countries to complain when
environmental laxity is used to attract investment. The addition of such a provision to the
Agreement on TRIMs, combined with the efficient, authoritative dispute settlement of
DSB under WTO, will eliminate the fear of a “race to the bottom” of environmentalists,
guarantee an environmental-upward international investment flow, and may even
contribute to a “race-to-the top” international trade.
2. The potential trade-environment conflicts under TRIPS
With the objective to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade and
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, the Agreement
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)203 mainly addresses the
applicability of basic GATT obligations such as MFN and national treatment, the
principle of adequate intellectual property rights and the principle of effective
enforcement measures for these rights.204
Some potential trade-environment conflicts under the TRIPS have been noticed. One
is about the relation between the protection of Patent and the right of indigenous people
and the protection of traditional knowledge. Recently, with the emergence and
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developing of an international biotechnology market and its observable profitability,
developing countries with rich biodiversity have begun to claim their national
sovereignty over their biodiversity resources and demand benefit sharing from the
biotechnology developed, usually by developed countries. As a response to these claims,
in its preamble, the parties of Convention on Biological Diversity205 (CBD) reaffirm
states’ sovereignty over their own biological resources206 and recognize the desirability of
sharing equitably the benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge. What’s
more, the Convention provides substantial obligation for the parties to “respect, preserve
and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities
embodying traditional lifestyles” related to biodiversity and “promote their wider
application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from
the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices”.207
Though under the TRIPS agreement, members can, as a general principle, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition208 and provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent209 as long as they are consistent
with the provisions of the Agreement, the plain language here fails to give us a clear
expectation about how and to what extent special measures such as benefit sharing can be
taken to protect the right of indigenous people.
In the Doha ministerial conference, a declaration was adopted by ministers about the
relation of the TRIPS Agreement and public health. The declaration agrees TRIPS
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Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect
public health and reaffirms that flexibility provided in the Agreement should be fully
used for this purpose. Particularly, it instructs the Council for TRIPS to find an
expeditious solution to the problem about WTO members without sufficient or any
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector before the end of 2002. However,
the Council failed to reach any conclusion before the deadline.210
Another potential conflict is about the protection of intellectual property law and the
requirement of technology transfer or support from developed countries to developing
countries provided in many international environmental agreements. For example, the
London Amendments in 1990 to the Montreal Protocol provide:
Each Party shall take every practicable step, consistent with the programmes
supported by the financial mechanism, to ensure:
(a) That the best available environmentally safe substitutes
and related technologies are expeditiously transferred to
Parties operating under paragraph 1 of Article 5211; and
(b) That the transfers referred to in subparagraph (a) occur
under fair and most favourable conditions.212
Though the TRIPS Agreement recognizes the special need of least-developed
countries and gives an extended transition period to least developing countries of their
obligations under the Agreement213, such advantage is very limited.
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However, it should be noticed that the provisions about intellectual property rights or
technology transfer in these international environmental agreements are themselves
general rather than substantive and need further explanation. What is more, the potential
conflicts above may be first of all a problem of law, including both Intellectual Property
Law and International law (addressing the relation between different international
agreements), rather than a problem of international trade. Before they are addressed in
these two levels, WTO should not be expected to do more on these issues.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS
In this article we discuss both the general relation between trade and environment and
the resolution of specific trade and environment conflict in practice. What we can
conclude here is there is no fundamental conflict between environmental protection and a
multilateral trading system. Rather, trade liberalization and environmental protection
should develop hand in hand towards the improvement of human welfare. In particular,
WTO, as the leader of the trade regime, provide broad chances to accommodate
environmental goals, including environment exceptions under Article XX of GATT, the
SPS and TBT Agreements for the maintenance of high environmental standards, the
participation of NGOs, and the flexibility provided by the Dispute Settlement Body in
applying these environment-related trade rules. And WTO should be trusted to have the
capacity and sincerity in resolving various current and potential trade and environment
conflicts. The process of accommodation will be ongoing. At the same time,
environmentalists should admit that environmental protection does not require the
erection of new trade barriers and learn to work within the context of the legal framework
for international trade to achieve their goals. At last, the opportunity to advance both
environmental protection and trade liberalization under the overarching goal of
sustainable development relies on both the international trade and environment regimes
to facilitate cooperation and mutual support.
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